Insurgent Notes

It was the very same month, as the one we are typing these short notes, though six years ago, when we met in person with Loren Goldner. Informed as we were that he was visiting nearby Italy, we promptly invited him to Athens so as to stage a public event and discuss with him about his, then recent, book Revolution, Defeat and Theoretical Underdevelopment (Russia, Turkey, Spain, Bolivia). An important book that shows how the counter–revolutionary promotion of the Soviet state’s national interests under the guise of “anti–imperialism,” its interests as a nation–state within the broader, international capitalist balance of power, started long before Stalin’s “socialism in one country” doctrine in 1924.

In order to better link Loren’s in–depth critique of the anti–imperialist ideology to the history of the Greek proletariat’s struggles, we had asked him to present the second chapter of the previously mentioned book, the one focusing on the RSFSR/USSR–Kemal alliance that was tragically signed with the flesh and blood of Turkish communists (“Socialism in One Country” Before Stalin, and the Origins of Reactionary “Anti–Imperialism”: The Case of Turkey, 1917–25). That offered us the opportunity to further discuss the evolution (or, rather, bolshevization) of the Greek Socialist/Communist Party (SEKE), in the context of the Greek–Turkish war of 1922 in Asia Minor and the on–going struggles of the newly formed Greek, yet multinational, proletariat.

For Goldner, and for us as well, the parallel study of Greece–Turkey–RSFSR/USSR from that specific perspective offers a two–fold critical assessment of the anti–imperialist ideology—and its disastrous outcomes for the anti–capitalist cause. Firstly, on the grounds of its ability, both as an ideology and a practice, to spew capitalist nation–states –potentially imperialist ones, too, should the circumstances and the intra–capitalist dynamics allow such geopolitical manoeuvres––by crushing all local class movements that go beyond and against the horizons of the national–liberation popular fronts. Secondly, on the grounds of the local socialist/ communist parties’ dutiful attunement to the USSR’s particular foreign and trade policy needs. As far as the Turkish Communist Party is concerned, that attunement led to its actual destruction by the supposedly anti–imperialist–Kemalist regime which was vividly supported by RSFSR/USSR so that an efficient “buffer–zone” between the latter and the “West” could be secured.

Regarding Greece, SEKE’s rather moderate anti–war internationalism was also aligned to the USSR’s strategic plans and became even more so by the time it got fully bolshevized and championed the expansion of Greek–Russian trade co–operation–a demand that was apparently also promoted by the Greek capitalist class. This is not to say that SEKE’s own deficiencies and limitations could determine the behaviour of the local (multinational) proletariat; the latter managed to express, in many cases on its own terms, class–war internationalism.

It goes without saying that the importance of such critical discussions, public or not, becomes even more evident as proletarian internationalism has largely collapsed today, given the reactions towards the on–going wars, both in Ukraine and the Middle East. In a truly Orwellian twist, “internationalism” has come, in our sad times, to represent the… international support for a nation–state building plan; the international support for this or that national capitalist class; international support for a nation–state defense; or, even the shameful co–operation of (wannabe) “left–communists” with Stalinists under the pretext of “anti–colonial,” “anti–war” sit–ins. Loren, you will be missed!

October 2024

What follows is the English translation of the texts we presented during the joint public event with Loren in October 2018 in Athens. Loren’s presentation has not been preserved in paper form but see the aforementioned chapter in his book to read what he had to say. The third part is only partially modified (mostly by means of the inclusion of extra footnotes) so that it would allow those comrades who are not explicitly familiar with the Greek labour movement to better understand the social–political context of the 1918–1922 period. Since we chose to publish these texts as they were, we made no further modifications based on new books or other bibliographical sources that were published after 2018. In that sense, it could be argued that the texts may contain certain limitations in terms of the provided documentation.

A few words about us:

Red Thread publications were initiated by TPTG and friends in 2002. Ιn the preface to the first book we published,1 we stated that our primary objective was to show that communism is a lasting, existing antagonistic tendency here today; that this antagonistic tendency we belong to comes from afar and continues to go through its long and painful road.

The texts we publish do not attempt to present yet another ideology, or another program or doctrine. The practical need for communism stems from the need to overcome the dead–end of contradictory capitalist social relations and the real, everyday struggles of the proletariat.

Our publications attempt to outline the theoretical diversity and the practical experience of the communist movement and class struggles from the 19th century onwards, seeking to contribute to the exploration of the historical perspective in which today’s social conflicts can be understood and shed light on the paths and methods through which we can overcome separations (national, occupational, gender, or others) among us, in the struggle for the recomposition of the human community.

Who is our guest, Loren Goldner?

As a student at the University of California/Berkeley in the spring of 1966, Goldner participated in anti– war demonstrations, building occupations and confrontations at the university to maintain the right to student draft deferments and he was arrested during one of these mobilizations. He is mistrustful of the Maoist, Trotskyist, and Third Worldist groups of that time, and his encounter with Marx’s work and his real education in Marxist politics takes place in the Independent Socialist Clubs (ISC)–that became the International Socialists in the 1970s. Soon, the movement in the United States and western Europe, the strike waves in the United States from 1966 to 1973, the May–June general strike in France 1968, the Italian struggles from 1969 to 1977, the Spanish and Portuguese working class upsurge in the mid–’70s all had a profound effect on him.

Everywhere, the surpassing of trade unions and workers parties’ tactics by the workers themselves in their wildcat strikes called into question the leftist analysis of unions as vehicles for advancing the working–class struggle. It was at that time that Loren first encountered the theory of the “ultra left”–libertarian communists, Situationists, the Socialism or Barbarism group in France around Lefort and Castoriadis, the ICC, the neo–Bordigists who were trying to synthesize the Dutch communist left theses and the Italian communist left—namely theoretical currents which have influenced us, as well.

However, apart from our political affiliation with Goldner, we also find his wide range of interests to be fascinating: his texts and books deal with a plethora of subjects ranging from the October Revolution, crisis and class struggles everywhere in the world, to analyses of racism, the Enlightenment and a critique of postmodernism.

Until his death, he participated in Insurgent Notes, a journal of communist theory and practice, and he also had his personal site, Break their haughty power. 2

Some of his texts have been translated and published in Greek, such as :

Communism is the Material Human Community: Amadeo Bordiga Today

Fictitious capital for Beginners, by Coghnorti

Revolutionary Termites in Faridabad, by the Rebelnet

The Spanish Revolution, Past and Future

Short History of the World Working–Class Movement from Lassalle to Neo– Liberalism

We’re Tempted to Say We Told You So, But We Won’t, by Enzymo

The Sky Is Always Darkest Just Before the Dawn: Class Struggle in the United States from the 2008 Crash to the Eve of the Occupations Movement—The Occupy Movement in the USA, by SKYA.

We invited Loren to speak about a chapter from his book Revolution, Defeat and Theoretical Underdevelopment, “’Socialism in One Country’ Before Stalin, and the Origins of Reactionary ‘Anti–Imperialism’: The Case of Turkey, 1917–1925.” 3

In it, he deals with the very early years of the Turkish Communist Party (TCP) and refutes the widespread view that the promotion of Soviet national interests, its interests as a nation–state within the broader, international capitalist balance of power, only started with Stalin’s “socialism in one country” doctrine in 1924. In fact, Goldner shows how it started well before, through Bolshevik anti–imperialist ideology (mainly Leninism) and its relation to the new nationalist, anti–colonial, movements in central Asia or elsewhere which emerged out of the crumbling multi–national empires. He shows in particular why the Bolsheviks became allies of the Kemalist nationalist developmental regime, what their particular interests were and why this alliance was not shaken by the massacre of the Central Committee of the Turkish CP in January 1921, in all likelihood by Kemalist nationalist forces. On the contrary, the Soviets concluded a trade agreement with that same Kemalist regime only some months later and kept quiet about the massacre and the Turkish Communists’ suppression for further months. In other words, Goldner explains why Turkish communists and the other revolutionary movements in the region did not have the support of the Bolsheviks and why the preservation of the Kemalist regime took precedence over possible proletarian revolution in the East.

This particular case gives us the opportunity to criticize the left anti–imperialist ideology–which has had a disastrous, long–standing impact on the Greek anti–authoritarian, autonomist and anarchist milieu– through the unfolding of the events that led to its first implementation, in the early years of the October Revolution. Because our focus is primarily on the political uses of anti–imperialist theories that attempt to justify views and attitudes that undermine a class struggle perspective, we consider it necessary to highlight the events that demonstrate the specific political intent of the Bolsheviks in that early period of anti–imperialism.

Specifically,

• Anti–imperialism is the ideology that legitimizes the creation of new nation–states out of the old crumbling empires and the old colonial systems, and they themselves prove to be imperialist, too.
• The Comintern’s anti–imperialism was part of a much more ambitious political strategy aiming at the reconfiguration of the global imperialist chain and the safeguarding of the Soviet state and, as a consequence, it was selective.

We should also add that one of the two main sources Goldner used in his text, the Turkish comrades’ (who were then part of the ICC) brochure, can also be found in Greek. The text of the Turkish group, titled “The Left wing of the Turkish Communist Party,” was published in four consecutive issues in Enzymo journal (before its nationalist, reactionary mutation).

Anti–imperialism as a means of Bolshevik foreign and internal counter–revolution

There has been much debate about counter–revolution since the 2008 riots in Greece. Usually, the debate is limited to modern police–military control techniques. It seldom extends to the origins of counter–revolution–the events that followed immediately after the great proletarian revolution in 1917 in Russia.

The constituent elements of the Bolshevik counter–revolution can be summarized under the following headings:

• introduction of state–monopoly capitalism;
• establishment of a “left” police to monitor whether proletarian behaviour is politically correct or not;
• depoliticisation of the press and vilification of strikes and labour riots in Russia as “petty–bourgeois” or “counter–revolutionary” actions;
• exerting pressure on the western workers’ parties to support the bourgeois national liberation movements in the East;
• inauguration of diplomatic, military and commercial relations with Western imperialists;
• introduction of the theory of “socialism in one country.”

On 8 January 1918, during an assembly of party cadres, Lenin supported the idea of a separate peace agreement with the German imperialist state. The left of the party opposed this proposal and claimed that such a peace was against the principles of proletarian internationalism and would strengthen Austro–German imperialism. Lenin replied that Russia’s participation in the war would strengthen Anglo–French imperialism. “In neither case,” he said, “would we be entirely escaping some sort of imperialist bond”. By distorting the standpoint of the left of his party, the chairman of the Council of People’s Commissars came to a conclusion that included the new theory of socialism in one country:

The correct conclusion from this is that the moment a socialist government triumphed in any one country, questions must be decided, not from the point of view of whether this or that imperialism is preferable, but exclusively from the point of view of the conditions which best make for the development and consolidation of the socialist revolution which has already begun.

In other words, the underlying principle of our tactics must not be, which of the two imperialisms it is more profitable to aid at this juncture, but rather, how the socialist revolution can be most firmly and reliably ensured the possibility of consolidating itself, or, at least, of maintaining itself in one country until it is joined by other countries.4

At the next session of the Central Committee, on 11 January, Stalin, a politician as “pragmatic” and “insightful” as Lenin, taking sides with the latter, declared at their party’s Central Committee: “There is no revolutionary movement in the west, nothing existing, only a potential, and we cannot count on a potential.”

At Brest–Litovsk, on March 3, the Soviets signed a peace agreement which was painful for them. They gave the Germans a quarter of the former Tsarist empire—Ukraine, Poland, a part of Belarus, Finland and the Baltic countries. In addition to 60 million people, these areas included one–third of the railway system, over half the industrial enterprises, three–quarters of steel factories and almost all coal mines.

Four days later, at the 7th Congress of the Social Democratic Workers’ Party of Russia (Bolsheviks), thereafter called Communist, Lenin explained what the party program would be henceforth:

Yes, we shall see the international world revolution, but meanwhile it is a very nice fairy–tale, a very pretty fairy–tale. I quite understand that it is natural for children to like pretty fairy–tales, but I ask: is it natural for a serious revolutionary to believe fairy–tales?5

Everything should be subordinated to the logic of building a new disciplined people’s state:

The last flareup of the war has given the Russian people a bitter, painful, but serious lesson, forcing them to organize themselves, to discipline themselves, to learn how to submit, to create a model discipline. Learn from the Germans their discipline, otherwise we are a doomed people and shall forever be prostrate in slavery.6

“Socialism” for Lenin did not mean the change of productive relations, the abolition of the capitalist mode of production. No, “socialism” signified the growth of productive forces, piece–wages,7 the Taylorist organization of labour, the one–man management of production, the separation between those who take decisions and those who carry out tasks. “Socialism” was not equal to the conscious creation of a new human community by the working class itself; it merely meant voluntary adaptation of the workers to the rhythm of the capitalist labour machine:

The masses must have the right to choose responsible leaders for themselves… But this does not at all mean that the process of collective labour can remain without definite leadership, without precisely establishing the responsibility of the person in charge, without the strictest order created by the single will of that person… Socialism owes its origin to large–scale machine industry. If the masses of the working people in introducing socialism prove incapable of adapting their institutions in the way that large–scale machine industry should work, then there can be no question of introducing socialism… At the present moment we are immediately confronted by the tasks of strictly separating discussion and airing questions at meetings from unfailing execution of all instructions of the person in charge… There must be voluntary fulfillment of the instructions of this individual leader, there must be a transition from the mixed form of discussions, public meetings, fulfillment –and at the same time criticism, checking and correction– to the strict regularity of a machine enterprise.8

However, because there were “slackers,” “parasites” and “bums” who did not seem willing to obey the instructions of the managerial “organizational talents,” the President encouraged his followers to proceed to convictions without trial:

In one place half a score of rich, a dozen rogues, half a dozen workers who shirk their work (in the manner of rowdies, the manner in which many compositors in Petrograd, particularly in the party printing–shops, shirk their work) will be put in prison. In another place they will be put to cleaning latrines. In a third place they will be provided with “yellow tickets” after they have served their time, so that everyone shall keep an eye on them, as harmful persons, until they reform. In a fourth place, one out of every ten idlers will be shot on the spot.9

Since “the economic essence of imperialism is monopoly capitalism,”10 and state–monopoly capitalism is “the little half part of socialism” (it only lacks the right political form), as the Chairman informed us in May 1918, when for the nth time he was praising German capitalism,11 and since, let’s repeat it, the imperialist ties are inevitable, Lenin turned to the Entente forces in the autumn of 1918 after Germany was defeated to ensure the consolidation of his state and its “socialist” program.

On December 25, 1918, Litvinov handed over to the leader of the Norwegian Social Democrats, Ludwig Meyer, the Soviet peace proposal to the allies, according to which a political amnesty law would be introduced in Russia, censorship of the press would be abolished, the right of national self–determination would be granted to Poland, Ukraine etc. and the foreign debt of the Tsarist regime would be re–examined. In addition, the Soviets would “refrain from any kind of propaganda against the Allied countries, which could be seen as interference in their internal affairs.” In return, the Soviets asked for financial and technical assistance and the termination of allied military operations on their territory.12

On February 4, 1919, Chicherin returned with a better proposal. The Soviet government was prepared to concede territories belonging to the Tsarist Empire to the allies, recognize the foreign debt of the Tsar, pay interest on new loans in the form of raw materials, guarantee mineral rights and forest products to foreign capitalists and restrain their propaganda in the countries of Entente.13

One of the main reasons that the Entente, and especially the French government, refused these offers was because they believed that they could have the whole pie through trade embargo and military operations.

At the same time, in March 1919, the Soviet state established the so–called Communist International as a means of pressure against British imperialism in the East and as a key instrument of its foreign policy.

After the “economic blockade” of Soviet Russia was lifted in January 1920, diplomatic contacts between the British and the Soviet governments began, which resulted in the Anglo–Soviet trade agreement of March 16, 1921, and the introduction of the New Economic Policy in Russia.

Lenin’s and his staff’s attempt to persuade western capitalists that the Soviet regime would be a more reliable partner than a Russia of White Guards and private capitalism, in one way or another, came to fruition. This policy was expressed in the most explicit way by the former trade commissar Bronski in an interview with the Italian socialist newspaper Avanti! on August 5, 1920:

International capitalists know very well that a bourgeois Russia would be a financial weight on their shoulders, and this would mean new taxes; the obligations of a bourgeois state towards its own bourgeoisie would be enormous, and world capitalism would be compelled to take on these obligations over the next two decades, while we are not a burden. A bourgeois Russian state would be unable to pay the foreign loans it contracted, while we can. We can pay not only with our gold but with our natural resources, our vast thick forests, our boundless and fertile soil, and our mines. If you are about to retort that even a bourgeois Russia could pay with these same means, I’ll tell you right away, NO! Because the Russian proletarians would not work in a bourgeois state, while with us they work willingly without a timetable and without excessive salary demands, because they are directly involved in the regime that they themselves have created. I’ll tell you something else: not only would Russian workers produce more but so would workers in other countries if they knew that their products were going to proletarian Russia … The miners of Germany and Czechoslovakia have declared several times that if they knew they were working for [trade] with proletarian Russia they would refrain from striking and would increase their own working hours. That is the secret of our strength which a bourgeois Russia could not have.14

Whereas, with regard to the western front, Soviet foreign policy was working towards an international organization of exploiters and a reorganization of the imperialist chain through individual trade agreements (and not only), on the eastern front, the same purpose was served by the promotion of national liberation and anti–colonial, developmental, authoritarian regimes, such as Kemal Ataturk’s in Turkey.

The contents of Loren’s remarks were based on the above–named chapter.

On the other side of the borders…

As discussed earlier on, the left wing of the TCP recognized SEKE’s15 anti–war contribution during the 1919–22 Greek–Turkish war. More specifically, they stated that “[w]e should be satisfied with these comrades of ours for having fulfilled their duty successfully both in Turkey and Greece. It is an indisputable fact, nowadays, that the defeat of the Greek troops is mainly due to the successful propaganda of the Greek communist comrades against the war both within the army forces and among the Greek workers. The influence of their propaganda was so great that today the Greek government should think seriously before dragging the country towards a new war, because it is fully aware that it will have a negative outcome and will result in a much greater defeat for the Greek bourgeoisie: an insurrection and a takeover of power by the Greek working class. Turkish workers, comrades! Be sure that the Greek communists have done much more for the Turkish workers than the Turks and the Muslim merchants and generals who filled up both their stomachs and warehouses during the last war by making you eat mud instead of bread.”16

Actually, bearing in mind Loren’s in–depth analysis of the TCP–RSFSR/USSR politics, they should have instead noted that the Greek workers have done a lot more for the Turkish workers and TCP than the Bolsheviks themselves.

What exactly happened on the other side of the still–under–formation–borders? Was the multinational Greek proletariat so effective in sabotaging the war effort? Before delving into the local working–class movement, let us first share a few words about its condition.

According to data cited by A. Benaroya, the Jewish leader of the Socialist Workers’ Federation in the Ottoman Empire and later on in Greece,17 the 1910 decade was characterized by an industrial boom.18 By 1918 there were about 700 large industrial enterprises, employing about 70,000 proletarians. Another 60–70,000 workers were employed in small–scale manufactures and the trade sector. Of these, more than 75,000 were organized in trade unions during the same period.

Outlining the political context of the period, it must be noted that the modernizing regime of the Venizelos’ government was actually in favour of a workers’ confederation, so as to establish a more liberal capitalist public sphere, freed from the limitations of the organization of work in the quasi–feudal Ottoman empire (e.g., guild–based labour division and production control, workers’ self–help clubs), but also in order to effectively mediate, contain and pacify emerging workers’ struggles. Having said that, Venizelos obviously envisaged a liberal workers’ confederation, not a socialist–oriented one, which would also serve as a means to further achieve the goal of national integration and promote nationalist claims in the international fora.19

In the 1st general workers’ Congress (October 21–28, 1918), from which the General Confederation of Workers of Greece (GSEE) would emerge, there participated 214 unions representing about 65,000 workers.20 Against the liberal/reformist political factions, including those who rejected class struggle as a matter of principle, the Confederation’s final charter explicitly referred to class struggle and the need to “guard class struggle against all bourgeois influence.”21 It also called for a Democratic Federation of the Balkan States. At the same time, though, the Venizelist trend obtained the control of the administrative council.

The constant entanglement of the Greek state in imperialist warfare between 1912–1922 (the Balkan Wars, World War I, the Greek Campaign in Ukraine in 1919)22 and the consecutive massive conscription led to a reduction in the local relative surplus population: a shortage of labour was observed leading to rises in nominal wages, although the general financial situation of the working class remained dire.23

Already by the 1919 May Day celebrations, the radical tendency of the GSEE (affiliated to SEKE, which as mentioned before had, in the meantime, been founded) “wanted to turn the celebration into an anti–government rally, while the government trade unionists, on the contrary, sought to tie the labour movement to the chariot of the dominant policy and class compromise.”24 The authorities made use of the “exceptional national circumstances” and dispersed the rally.25

Moreover, in response to the participation of more than 20,000 Greek soldiers against the Bolsheviks in Ukraine and the occupation of Smyrna by Greek troops in May 1919,26 anti–war articles were regularly published in Rizospastis [“The Radical”], a newspaper then run by Petsopoulos and linked to SEKE. In counter–response, Petsopoulos and Dimitratos got arrested.27

Despite state repression, class tension remained high. In 1919, a strike of 2,500 machinists in the industrial centre of Piraeus, a key sector amid war preparations, lasted for 3 months and faced the employers’ lockout.28 “The strike reached other industries in Piraeus, the chemical fertilizer plants, while workers in the paper mill were already on strike,”29 and was finally called off on February 8th, 1920, after the intervention of the reformist Transit and Transportation Union.

In April 1920 the tobacco workers in the non–homogeneous–in terms of ethnicity, religion and language–region of Western Macedonia went on strike (Thessaloniki, Xanthi, Kavala).30 The strike was held against attempts to deskill the profession by means of unprocessed tobacco exports.31 In its proclamation after the end of the strike, SEKE attempted to link it with the ongoing war in Asia Minor: “The bourgeoisie, the privileged class of society, the leech that sucks our sweat and blood, has under–taken another struggle, to become the guardian of the European and American capitalist class. As unscrupulous as it is, it has bartered away the will of our working class to the international capitalists and therefore it is doubly interested in keeping us enslaved.”32

In September 1920, SEKE’s statement, titled “Against the Treaty of Sevres” (July 28/ August 10, 1920), was published by Rizospastis newspaper: “Our fatherland, whose name is appropriated by them [i.e. the capitalists], the fatherland of those whom we have been sent to fight for, is nothing but the geographical area on which exploitation is spread. The expansion of which they rejoice is the expansion of the limits of exploitation and profitable investment of their capital […] In the emancipation of the enslaved brothers they see nothing but the obtaining of cheap labour for their industry, cheap slaves for their manors and estates, new consumers for their merchandise.” The statement continues as follows: “The time of war has come, the enemy is within the borders and not beyond them!”33

After the Extraordinary Electoral Congress of SEKE in September 1920, an anti–war statement was issued: “stop the war and fight by all means any attempt for a new war and a new conscription, grant a general amnesty to all convicted and all those under trial for political and military matters (deserters, disobedient soldiers).” It also asked the Greek state to “definitively recognize the Russian Workers’ Republic and establish regular economic and political relations with it,”34 echoing the constant pursuits of Russian foreign policy at that time–as it will be shown later on, that was the case in other instances, too.

On September 20, 1920, one of the two newspapers affiliated to SEKE, Ergatikos Agonas (“Labour Struggle”), published an anti–war text by Pouliopoulos, under the title “The Voice of the Soldiers of the Front,” which, despite its promising title, was largely vague [Official Texts of the KKE, vol. 1 (1918–1924), pp. 114–116]. However, this article reflects the anti–war tensions within the Greek army in Asia Minor.

During the November 1920 election, SEKE mainly focused on anti–war ideological/ political actions against Venizelos’ government.35 We could talk of strictly propagandist activities, because “SEKE has no claim to take the power today. It was only during the war that the local working class began to get awakened and organized, only now has it taken up the struggle for the awakening and organization of all working and suffering classes, etc.”36 Actually, the question of its participation in the elections and, consecutively, that of a closer connection between GSEE and SEKE had already been raised at its Second Congress (April 5–12, 1920).

During the 1920 elections that were held with a complex electoral system, which allowed casting votes to two parties, some members estimated that the party received approximately 100,000 votes.37 Benaroya himself understates the votes down to 35,000. The predominance of the monarchists, who were against the government and thus against the war, also reflected this broad interclass anti–war social tendency. Not surprisingly, however, the newly elected government continued the war: new conscription and compulsory internal borrowing (–50 percent on the face value of banknotes) were announced soon after.38

The “internal front”

A great wave of strikes erupted in 1921, that is during the on–going war. Some estimates put the number of major strikes in 1921 at about 50, involving 40,000 workers, some of which are listed below.

On 16–22 February 1921, in Volos, a general workers’ rally against the rising cost of living and war turned into riots. The army was called in to suppress the riots, while telegrams described the situation as a “Bolshevik revolution.”39 “The signal for the start of the riots was given when Benaroya, hearing the sound of a piano from a neighbouring house, interrupted his speech to say: ‘While we are talking about the hunger of the people, they are playing the piano’.”40 In the same month, seamen working on ships owned by L. Empeirikos, a famous ship–owning family, went on strike. Empeirikos was also Minister of Food. The strike ended with the forced conscription of the strikers, the very same day as the railway strike began, on 21 February 1920.

Although reformist, the Railway Workers’ Federation, which had refused to be associated with SEKE and therefore with GSEE, launched a strike that paralyzed the whole local railway network, demanding wage increases, as well as raising the issue of an 8–hour workday. Although the government’s counter–proposal for a 9–hour workday was adopted, by a margin of only 11 votes, the strike continued. The government then moved on conscripting the strikers and thus hundreds of them were sent by force to the Asia Minor’s front.41 However, this led to a more rapid diffusion of radical anti–war ideas among the soldiers.

In 1921, despite the fact that the May Day celebration was forbidden, it did take place, nevertheless. Interestingly, soldiers refused to board the ships that would take them to Asia Minor and joined the strikers. As a result, the government declared martial law and some of those arrested, such as Stinas, were brought before the Extraordinary Military Court of Adrianople.42

In November 1921, the Federation of Electrokinesis (which included tram workers, railway workers, workers in light gas and electricity power) declared a strike. Once again, the response by the state was harsh: martial courts and severe sentences for those arrested, among them members and cadres of SEKE.43

The next month, the rally of olive oil producers in Corfu, asking for free export of olive oil, rapidly evolves into an anti–war demonstration. According to the vivid description of a participant –then, also a deserter– “trumpets and dynamite accompany the chants ‘down with the war’,” while “a platoon of soldiers joins the angry farmers. The authorities are terrified. The prefect was shaking so much when he went to the window to speak that his dentures fell off."44 According to Benaroya, despite the defeat, “a broad anti–war propaganda is developed at the front and in the rear.”45

On top of that, in March–April 1922, port–workers at Thessaloniki, bakery workers, dock–workers, carpenters, electricians and tobacco workers in two major production centers of the recently annexed Macedonia (Kavala and Xanthi) went on strike.

Class insubordination on the Asia Minor front

While this was the case in Greece, what was happening on the front? According to one source, the number of deserters reached 90,000 and some of them were armed. Another source offers a more moderate estimation, reducing that number to 60,000. Dimitratos, then secretary of SEKE, during the discussion on the “national question” at the 3rd Congress of the CI (12 July 1921), mentions 100,000 deserters.46 However, that issue was not just a question of numbers, as it did have a qualitative aspect, too. According to some sources, the conscripted railway workers served as efficient links between the different communist groups at the front, distributing anti–war written material amidst the soldiers and the locals. They also were of practical help to many deserters abandoning the front and communist cadres visiting military units, alike.

About 200 people from the workers’ clubs/groups gathered at the front, at least according to some testimonies.47 In almost all the units at the front there were communist cells, Stinas argues.48 Benakis claims that actions were mainly taken around Smyrna, not on the eastern front of Prussia.49 According to other sources, however, a more conservative assessment is shared: the actual contribution of the communist cells must have been less crucial, as there weren’t that many SEKE(K) members/cadres anyway at the time. For example, during the Second Congress that took place in April 1920, only 1,000 members were registered (among them there were 500 youngsters), while the distribution of workers’ newspapers hardly exceeded 16,000 copies all in all.

At the front, it has been confirmed that there were at least 19 soldiers’ newspapers in circulation. Those newspapers arrived at the frontline through Thessaloniki and Alexandroupolis (then called Dedeagats), most probably from the summer of 1921 onwards. Others were handwritten and circulated by the soldiers themselves. Some were legal (humorous, like Founta) but two were communist ones (e.g., the “Red Guard” and “Bohemio”). Kemal’s forces picked out material from the anti– government Greek press which was in circulation in Istanbul and then they distributed these anti–war articles to the front, to further undermine Greek soldiers’ morale.

For this purpose, the actual anti–war coordination among the Greek soldiers was very important and it led, later on, to the initiation of the Movement/Union of War Veterans in 1924. According to Stinas, the anti–war movement in Corfu in 1923, in which “Archive–Marxists” participated, organized an anti–tax campaign and a land workers’ strike.50

During the collapse of the front (1922), according to the eloquent accounts by a lot of participants, a soldiers’ strike broke out. More specifically in Tekirdag (also known as Raidestos), red flags were raised and armed groups chanted: “Long live the Soviets,” as the authorities were being abolished.51 At the same period, SEKE(K)’s Central Committee and the 22 most active communists at the front got arrested. The latter were sent to prisons in Smyrna on the charge of high treason. However, their trials did not take place as the Greek military apparatus collapsed, alongside the regime’s imperialist aspirations. The ex–prisoners, joined by other SEKE’s members who were in Smyrna in those days, held a meeting. Some proposed to seize power and march with the army against the Greek government. Others, being more realistic as one could argue, proposed to simply return back to Greece with their units, while others decided to remain in Smyrna opting to reach the Soviet Russia.

Outcomes

Both the ICC pamphlet and Dumont point out that SEKE’s agitation against the war was indeed an important factor in the collapse of the front. Dumont, based on a Soviet source, claims that “[t]he Greek Communists rose up against the war in Asia Minor starting in mid–1920. It seems that they, by their active anti–militarist propaganda, significantly contributed to the undoing of the troops sent to Anatolia. Starting at the end of 1920, desertions in the Hellenic army multiplied and there is every evidence that a certain number of mutinies took place in the barracks around Smyrna. According to N. Dimitratos, the delegate of the Greek Communist Party at the Third Congress of the Comintern, more than 100,000 ‘workers and peasants’ had deserted during the first two years of the war. This figure may seem a bit Homeric, but it nonetheless gives a certain idea of the extent of the phenomenon.”52

However, Stinas relativized SEKE’s actual political footprint on the anti–war movement at the front, as he clarifies that “all this anti–war and anti–militarist movement was taking place without the knowledge and against the will of the Central Committee. The party had in no sense a firm line and specific objectives. Its policy was confusing, opportunist, perhaps pacifist and ‘pro–workerist,’ but nothing more than that. Now and then, articles with resounding titles like ‘Bordello’s State,’ ‘We answer with the phrase of Cabron’ [note: Shit!], etc. broke out, but nowhere could you see and nowhere was there a revolutionary politics that would in some way respond to the critical conditions due to the ongoing war.”53 Simultaneously, Stinas argues, there was no denunciation of the Muslim population’s persecution in Thrace during 1921.54 The most immediate interests of SEKE were different. Among the resolutions of the 1st Extraordinary Conference (February 6, 1922) it was explicitly specified that the party “needs a long legal existence,” because it “still is within an organizational and propaganda period,” while at the same time the Greek capitalist state is characterized by “the spirit of petty–bourgeois compromise which manifests itself through the commitment of the popular and working masses towards democratic and parliamentarian institutions.” It is obvious that during this period SEKE is seeking to secure a more active role within the bourgeois political sphere.

It is in this context that SEKE denounced desertion as a strategy of “individualism” and “cowardice,” while at the same time it declared its… opposition to war, stating the need for united fronts. More specifically, “[t]he Party takes into account with satisfaction the fact that it has always remained an anti–war party and has opposed all nationalist efforts and imperialist alliances of the parties of the old and new bourgeoisie. It considers that its gained recognition on this question must be developed through intensified and methodical propaganda against all wars. Its policy, regarding this point, however, should not be confused with pacifism and be based on the feelings of individualism and the cowardice of the fugitives. Its policy against war must always be demonstrated by exposing the calamities and destruction that befall the interests of the country and the people, and the dangers which pro–war tendencies cause against peace and coexistence of the Balkan and Eastern peoples in general. Our Party will thus expose not only the criminality of the policy of bourgeois parties, but will also point the way to the salvation of the Greek people through its close consultation and cooperation with the other peoples of the East.”55 The above mentioned excerpt is truly enlightening in that the practical resistance to the Greek imperialist policy (e.g., the soldiers’ strike during the collapse of the front) is downplayed as individualist as opposed to SEKE’s (vague) denunciatory/anti–war propaganda.

On March 23 1922, GSEE/SEKE denounced the new forced loan and taxation, correctly linking these measures to the ongoing war efforts, however, proletarian practical resistance remains a future goal, under the guidance of the party, as while “[i]t is time for the oppressed people to be saved and prevented from destruction, starvation and death,” people “must first wake up.”56

In 1922, during the congress of the Balkan Communist Federation in Sofia, in which the “national question,” especially with regards to the quest for an independent status for Macedonia, was discussed, Petsopoulos embraced and kissed the Turkish delegate in front of thousands of workers, simultaneously denouncing the war and speaking about the common interest of Turkish and Greek workers. Despite this statement, there was no mention in the Greek communist press of the fact that all the acts of repression and murder of Turkish communists committed by Kemalists one year before took place while their national liberation movement was in close economic and political alliance with Soviet Russia. In Greece, this statement made a great impression on the bourgeois press and, subsequently, Petsopoulos was expelled from SEKE, according to the resolutions of the Extraordinary Congress that took place in October 1922 so that the party could proceed with the ousting of all “internal opposition” and ratify February’s 1922 resolutions.57

The Bolshevization of the Greek party accelerated in 1924, the same year that the nationalist right–wing faction of TCP, backed up by the Comintern, assumed the leadership of that party. By 1925, both KKE and TCP had definitely become organs of Soviet foreign policy. Already by January 1924, according to a party announcement with the eloquent title: “The resumption of Greek–Soviet relations” SEKE claimed that “the resumption of our diplomatic relations with the new Russia… is also advantageous to our merchant shipping sector, since the Black Sea ports (Southern Russia) have always been the main trade route for the Greek merchant navy… This fact will have a favorable impact not only on commerce, but also on national economy.”58

As if this was not enough, the “Theses on the political situation,” which were published in Rizospastis newspaper in February 1924, stated, at its closing remark, that “our Party will fight for the immediate restoration of both commercial and political relations between Greece and the Union of the Soviet Republics of Russia.”59

By the end of that year (November 26 to December 3), SEKE is renamed KKE (Greek Communist Party). The “new” party, freed from its “internal enemies,” is now capable of further solidifying its ties to the USSR, undermining in that way the local class struggles.

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1. Gilles Dauvé, Eclipse and Re–emergence of the Communist Movement, https://www.kokkinonima.gr/?p=1.↩︎

2. See http://insurgentnotes.com/ and https://bthp23.com/.↩︎

3. The full text of the chapter is available at https://breaktheirhaughtypower.org/socialism–in–one–country–before–stalin–and–the–origins–of–reactionary–anti–imperialism–the–case–of–turkey–1917–1925/

   https://breaktheirhaughtypower.org/socialism–in–one–country–before–stalin–and–the–origins–of–reactionary–anti–imperialism–the–case–of–turkey–1917–1925/.↩︎

4. Lenin, Collected Works, Volume 26, p. 445.↩︎

5. Lenin, op. cit., Vol. 27, p. 102.↩︎

6. Ibid., p. 106.↩︎

7. Ibid., pp. 258, 583.↩︎

8. Ibid., pp. 212–213.↩︎

9. Lenin, op. cit., vol. 26, p. 414.↩︎

10. Lenin, op. cit., vol. 22, p. 298.↩︎

11. Lenin, op. cit., vol. 27, p. 340.↩︎

12. Degras, Soviet Documents on Foreign Policy, vol. 1, pp. 133–135.↩︎

13. Ibid. pp. 137–139.↩︎

14. Avanti!, 5/8/1920, cited in Piero Melograni, Lenin and the myth of world revolution.↩︎

15. The Socialist Workers’ Party of Greece (SEKE) was founded in November 1918 after the inauguration of the General Confederation of Workers of Greece (GSEE) and rather late compared to socialist parties in other countries. Later on, after its 2nd Congress (April 5–12, 1920) it will be renamed “SEKE(K)” (K for Communist). During the same year the party joins the Communist International and for a long time it will be wavering between the positions held by the 2nd and those held by the 3rd International. According to the decisions made in its 3rd Extraordinary Congress of 26 November–3 December 1924, it will be finally named KKE (Communist Party of Greece). To outline the internal ideological–political conflicts of the era one would need a separate text. Suffice to say that the local class struggle dynamics were only partially dependent on the intra–SEKE(K) conflicts, while the latter necessarily, though also partially, reflected the local class–based conflicts.↩︎

16. EKS/ICC, The left wing of the TCK, p. 81.↩︎

17. A. Benaroya, The first development of the Greek proletariat, pp. 110–115.↩︎

18. On the political level, see the modernising character of the 1909 “Goudi coup” and, later on, Venizelos’ Liberal/Republican government. The Goudi coup was a military coup d’état, in the aftermath of the 1897 Greek–Turkish war, the first of such military interventions in the local political scene. The coup paved the way to Eleutherios Venizelos’ involvement in Greek politics and, thus, it represents the transition to an era marked by two opposing political forces, the liberal Venizelism being the one and the conservative–monarchist anti–Venizelism the other.↩︎

19. Elefantis, The Promise of the Impossible Revolution: KKE and bourgeoisie in the inter–war period, p. 28–29; Stinas, Memories: Seventy years under the banner of socialist revolution, pp. 27–28.↩︎

20. Stinas, well known for his active participation in the labour movement as a member of KKE and smaller groups originating from the Archive–Marxist party, states a higher number of workers were represented in the Congress: 70–80,000. Op.cit., p. 28.↩︎

21. A small anarcho–syndicalist group of people including Speras, Koukhtsoglou and Fanourakis strongly opposed themselves to the principle according to which it was necessary to “guard against all bourgeois influence”. They insisted that the union must preserve itself not only from bourgeois influence but more generally from all political influence, implying the Socialist/Communist party as well. Ibid, p. 31.↩︎

22. In the first 5 months of 1919 more than 23,000 Greeks fought against the Red Army in Ukraine. This was a major intervention, given that the French army was unorganized and some of its main naval forces allied with the Red Army and strikers in Sebastopol. The Greek soldiers were, then, used to suppress this rebellion.↩︎

23. Bolaris, SEKE: The revolutionary roots of the Left in Greece, p. 21–22.↩︎

24. https://www.rizospastis.gr/story.do?id=4017252.↩︎

25. Bolaris, op. cit., p. 24. In the aftermath of those events, the venizelists left GSEE and initiated their own Confederation, based in the instrustrial centre/port of Piraeus, which was their stronghold.↩︎

26. On 2 to 15 May 1919 the Greek troops of the 1st Division, commanded by General Zafiriou, landed in Smyrna and occupied both the city and the surrounding areas with the support of the Greek, French and British naval forces. In October 1920, the Greek army advanced into East Asia Minor with the support of the above–mentioned countries, which, on their part, wanted to force the Turkish government to sign the Treaty of Sevres.↩︎

27. Benaroya, op. cit., p. 139. Founding member of SEKE, Dimitratos served as Secretary of the CC during the 1918–22 period. He then supported SEKE’s bolshevization, but later on became an advocate of SEKE’s “legal existence.” After his expulsion from SEKE, in 1924, he shortly allied with Benaroya to promote social–democratic positions.↩︎

28. Bolaris, op. cit., p. 29.↩︎

29. Kabagiannis, Τhe Trade–unionist Movement in Greece, 1918–1926, p. 80.↩︎

30. This region had become part of the Greek territory only 8 years earlier, after extended military operations, and hosted a great number of Muslim and Jewish proletarians–a lot of the latter were members of the largest socialist group, Federation, a group with an internationalist understanding that stood against the, then recently adopted, Zionist politics.↩︎

31. Bolaris, op. cit., pp. 29–30.↩︎

32. See Rizospastis, 17/5/1920. Official Texts of the KKE, vol. 1 (1918–1924), p. 83.↩︎

33. Ibid, pp. 106–108.↩︎

34. Ibid, p. 127.↩︎

35. Benakis, The other side of the Greek labour movement (1918–1930), p. 54.↩︎

36. Official Texts of the KKE, vol. 1 (1918–1924), p. 148, our emphasis.↩︎

37. See Benaroya, op. cit., p. 196–7.↩︎

38. Stinas, op. cit., p. 36.↩︎

39. Benaroya, op. cit., pp. 142–144; Stinas, op. cit., pp. 36–38.↩︎

40. Volos, a century. From the integration into the Greek state (1881) to the earthquakes (1955), Volos Publications, Volos 1999, p. 167–168.↩︎

41. Bolaris, op cit., pp. 33–36.↩︎

42. Stinas, op. cit., pp. 36–38.↩︎

43. Bolaris, op. cit., p. 39–40.↩︎

44. Stinas, op. cit., p. 38.↩︎

45. Benaroya, op. cit., p. 148.↩︎

46. J. Riddell, To the Masses: Proceedings of the Third Congress of the Communist International, 1921, 2015, p. 840. To that end, adding to the pressure exerted by defectionism, an also important factor was the low conscription rates, not only in Greece but also among Asia Minor’s Greek–speaking population. According to some Generals commanding troops in Asia the Greek speaking local population was way too reluctant to join the Greek forces, despite the multiple drafting sessions. Notwithstanding Greek government’s propaganda, the “liberation of Asia Minor’s Greeks” was not met with much enthusiasm by those concerned.↩︎

47. D. Livieratos, Pantelis Pouliopoulos: An intellectual revolutionary, p. 17.↩︎

48. Stinas, op. cit., p. 41.↩︎

49. Benakis, op. cit., p. 54.↩︎

50. Ibid, pp. 91–92.↩︎

51. Stinas, op. cit., p. 62; Benaroya, op. cit., p. 158.↩︎

52. Dumont, Paul, Du socialisme ottoman à l’internationalisme anatolien, Istanbul: Les Editions Isis, 1997, p. 392 n. 2.↩︎

53. Stinas, op. cit., pp. 41–42, our emphasis.↩︎

54. Ibid, pp. 54–55.↩︎

55. Official Texts of the KKE, vol. 1 (1918–1924), p. 211–225, first emphasis is ours.↩︎

56. Ibid, p. 236, our emphasis; See also p. 242–244 on linking war with savage taxation (21 May 1922).↩︎

57. Stinas, op. cit., p. 64, Benaroya, op. cit., p. 156, 160. Regarding the view favouring SEKE’s “legitimate operation,” see above. Obviously, this resolution caused lots of heated internal debates.↩︎

58. Official Texts of the KKE, vol. 1 (1918–1924), p. 392, our emphasis. A public announcement for the matter by the Greek ship–owners, merchants and bankers, three of the leading sectors of the local economy, wouldn’t have been that much different…↩︎

59. Ibid, p. 409, our emphasis.↩︎